( 18 )



N.B.: this conclusion was published separately in Arabic on our website on the 12th of Nov., 2012, two years before serializing this book into articles two years later and before compiling these articles in a book form later on.


The conclusion of an unpublished book about the Wahabi opposition movements:- (Nov., 2012)




1- Our Quranism website sometimes is attacked by hackers who try to creep into it like crawling insects to try to block it or to destroy its content, but we try as best as we can to stop them. This ongoing struggle has lasted since last week. We got used to this ongoing war against Quranism since 1977, when we have begun preaching Quranism, and the rounds of this war differ in persons, locations, and timings, but it remains a struggle between a free pen of a free thinker refuting religious myths on one hand, and those who are making a living off such religious myths on the other hand. Such beneficiaries hate the Quranic Truth, and consequently, they ardently want to break our free pen with all their might and power. This ongoing war against Quranism (i.e., true and real Islam as we see it) has a new field now: the cyberspace of the internet. Enemies and foes of Quranism fail to intellectually refute us using logical thinking and reasoning; hence, they use their full potential and power within several countries, billions of money, and billions of followers to destroy the Quranist thought. Previously, foes incarcerated us and persecuted us in many other ways in Egypt. When we left for the USA as a political asylee, we have enjoyed freedom of thought, expression, and belief away from the hands of our persecutors. Yet, hackers never cease to try to block and destroy our website, which is modest and simple yet unique in its intellectual content. If we have been afraid of anyone, we would not have continued our intellectual peaceful reform for more than 35 years. In fact, we feel indebted to our foes as we make good use of their folly and ignorance; a researcher/thinker like ourselves who lack means and money needs the barks of such ignoramuses so that publicity is done to Quranism for free, without exerting efforts on our part. People hear of Quranism as long as our foes verbally abuse us. The caravan of Quranists has been launched since 1977, and it has never lacked barking dogs, bringing free propaganda to Quranism, more fame to our person, and more momentum for us to write more and more articles and book/researches. God has been very good to our humble person: He has granted with a soul which is seeking and enjoying challenges. We have defied the persecution inflicted by our foes on us with more researching and producing more books and articles. We have written so far more than 2000 articles, books, researches, and fatwas (religious edict or view), and we have several writings that wait to be published online, including dramatic, artistic works penned by us in Egypt years ago.               


2- Challenges and the needed courage to rise to face them become more prominent when aggressions and persecutions aggravate. We feel bound to mention here that the worst period of persecution we have gone through was shortly before seeking political asylum in the USA and fleeing with our life before our enemies would manage to assassinate us. During this period of suffering, we have written this book about the Wahabi opposition movements in the KSA. During our period of ordeal, we insisted with great vehemence to write this book, in order to challenge such an ordeal and to face our feeling of being continuously threatened. We might have been assassinated anytime during those long months before we left to the USA. We have written that book while knowing beforehand that no publisher would publish it in print anywhere in any country. We have written this book to react to the persecution we have suffered without deserving it. We were living at the time in the low-class Al-Matariyya district in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, impecunious and in constant fear of double trouble: the terror caused by the government of Mubarak that wanted to incarcerate us and the worse Salafist/Wahabi terror that ardently seek to murder us. Our suffering at the time egged us on to write this book about the Wahabi opposition movements in the 20th century. We have written it to occupy our mind away from fear of being assassinated. We felt quite sure that any worldly ordeal must come to an end eventually, and whatever we write will not be in vain or a waste of time and effort. Such were the circumstances of writing this book at the time.        


3- This period has covered several months from 2000 to 2001. This was the worst ordeal we have undergone: to live in constant fright of being either arrested or murdered. The Saudi embassy in Egypt has been the body unofficially controlling the file of persecuting Egyptian Quranists. Some Quranists were active in their intellectual endeavors in Ibn Khaldoun Center, in Cairo, and we have been the director of a weekly forum in it. We undertook the supervision of all research activities inside it, and this included a project/program of reforming education systems in Egypt and another project/program of teaching Egyptians their political rights. Mubarak closed down Ibn Khaldoun Center, where we used to work and get a regular salary. The owner of the Center, Dr. Saad Eddine Ibrahim, was arrested in June 2000 under orders of Mubarak, along with some persons working in the Center and some of our fellow Quranists. Al-Akhbar daily Cairo-based governmental newspaper mentioned at the time that we ourselves got arrested, but this was a lie. It seemed that the authorities left us to live in constant fear of incarceration to force us to keep a low profile to avoid being arrested anytime. A police force from Al-Matariyya District Police Station positioned itself before the building we live in, to watch over us, waiting for orders of our arrest. While gathering and collecting material for this book, we felt frightened whenever our door was knocking. We feared at the time that the police force would arrest us and confiscate the draft of this book, as we have lost a draft of one of our books before when we got arrested in Nov. 1987. Thus, we have finished writing this book within a year of severe persecution since the closure of Ibn Khaldoun Center. We have written this book from June 2000 to June 2001.         


4- This book tackles several different types of Wahabi opposition movements against the rule of the Saudi royal family, beginning with the fanatical Wahabi Najd Brothers who opposed their master, Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, the very first king and founder of the third, current KSA, and who were his faithful bigots and soldiers whose disputes and conflicts with him drove them to rebel against him until he defeated and crushed them. Another opposition movement was peaceful and noble, initiated by the moderate Sunnite human-rights Saudi activist Nasser Al-Saeed. Another opposition movement was initiated by the Wahabi sheikh, theologian, and clergyman Juhayman Al-Otaybi who led and organized a movement that occupied the Kaaba Mosque in Mecca in the first day of 1400 A.H. another opposition movement that close the book was initiated by the religious panel formed by the end of the Gulf War by the leader Dr. Al-Masaary and his men, a movement that eventually begot Osama Bin Laden. Thus, our book has been based on researching Saudi opposition movements coming forth from inside Wahabism itself in order to assert an important fact that typically repeats itself: any theocracy suffer those who revolt against it based on self-proclamation as more ''pious'' and so more fit to rule instead of a present ruler who would be declared an ''infidel'' or an ''apostate''. This has occurred in the KSA and in Afghanistan, and we fear that this might occur in Egypt within a decade or so after writing this book.              


5- Having finished writing this book, we got news of our imminent arrest, and a day before the police force came to our apartment to arrest us, we managed to flee their constant watching over us. We remember our happiness inside the plane, heading to the USA, on Monday, 16th of October, 2001, looking in relief at the Egyptian deserts out the window, with every fiber of our being feeling grateful and thankful to Almighty God as He allowed our narrow escape from out persecutors: Mubarak and the Wahabis. Since then, we have enjoyed our dignity and freedom in the USA, with the grace and bounty of God, and we have launched our website to spread Quranism. The Wahabi war against us and Quranism goes on within the cyberspace. Some parts of this book have been published here online, especially parts about the MB terrorist organization established by agents of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in Egypt in 1928 to replace the Najd Brothers and the parts about Nasser Al-Saeed, the greatest man born in Arabia within the last millennium. It is high time to publish the whole of this book online.  


6- Within circumstances of Wahabi and Salafist hackers trying to block our website and destroy its contents, we have re-lived the atmosphere of the times when we have written this book in Cairo. We publish this part of the book now in 2012 as a reaction to such hackers/aggressors and to give an overview about the circumstances and conditions in the Middle East region before the 9/11 attacks in the USA, in order to compare them to the circumstances and conditions in the Middle East region now after the so-called Arab Spring that has turned into a bleak wintry long night of Wahabism and Salafism that will wreak havoc in the Middle East region and all over the world at large. Our dear readers will find that what we have written in 2000-2001 is still valid and related to our era now. 




  We are still engaged into an ongoing war that has begun since 1977 in Cairo, when we have started to spread Quranism. We spread innovative, original ideas and Wahabis of all sorts have no response but aggression and verbal abuse against us, because they could not refute our school of thought: Quranism. Our insistence grows more solid as our thought and notions stir their fury and expose their utter ignorance and sheer fraud. Quranism threatens the very existence of the Wahabi/Sunnite, Shiite, and Sufi religions. Thus, the difference between Quranists and Wahabis is shown; we, Quranists, write innovatively and originally to reveal forgotten and deliberately ignored facts of the Quran, and they, Wahabis, use all their power, might, wealth, and influence to misguide people and to lead them away from the divine path of God: the Quran. Each party of the two will be rewarded in the Hereafter according to their work and deeds. Almighty God will judge us and them in the day of Resurrection to reward each one individually as per one's faith and deeds, either in Hell or in Paradise. The sorrow of those denying the Quran and leading others away from its guidance will be immense and boundless. God says in the Quran: "Most surely We will support Our messengers and those who believe, in this life, and on the Day the witnesses arise. The Day when their excuses will not profit the wrongdoers and the curse will be upon them, and they will have the Home of Misery." (40:51-52). "Losers are those who deny the encounter with God. Then, when the Hour comes upon them suddenly, they will say, "Alas for us, how we have neglected it." And they will carry their burdens on their backs-evil is what they carry."(6:31).  "O man! You are laboring towards your Lord, and you will meet Him. As for him who is given his book in his right hand. He will have an easy settlement. And he will return to his family delighted. But as for him who is given his book behind his back. He will call for death. And he will enter the Hell-Fire" (84:6-12). God says nothing but the Absolute Truth.     



The conclusion written in 2001:


– 1 –


  When Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud began establishing the third current KSA, he put into his consideration the local, regional, and international powers. The international powers meant at the time GB. The regional powers meant Iran, Iraq, the Levant, and Egypt, and the last three were under the British occupation at the time. Shiites were reigning supreme in Iran, and in the royal line of rulers in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan among the family and descendants of Al-Sharif Hussein. Egypt consisted dominantly of Sunnite Sufis. As for local powers surrounding the KSA, they were Yemen, Oman, and other Gulf countries, with an influential portion of Shiites population in them as well. In addition, there is Shiite population in the eastern region and Al-Ahsa region, where oil has been discovered later on, and the Shiite Al-Sharif Hussein family members ruling Hejaz region, where Mecca and Yathreb are located. Shiites, we must remember, are the historical archenemies of Al-Saud royal family and their victims since the rise and collapse of the first and second Saudi states especially during Bedouin and military raids against Shiites. Thus, Shiites surround the burgeoning kingdom of Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in the east (Iran and the Gulf state), in the north (rulers/descendants of the Shiite Al-Sharif Hussein in Iraq and Jordan, and Shiites of Syria), and in the south (Yemen). In addition, Shiites inside the borders of the third, current KSA are deemed as time bombs. Hence, the burgeoning Saudi kingdom had no choice but to try very hard to control Egypt (a vast majority of Sunnite Sufis at the time) by converting Egyptians to Wahabism; or else, if Egypt were left alone with no Saudi influence, it might have joined the Shiite blocs surrounding the KSA, to the detriment of the Saudi kingdom. The Shiite influence poses a continual threat to the Saudis until now. There was another reason for Abdul-Aziz to endeavor to dominate Egyptian political, social, cultural and religious life; historically, Egypt was the country behind the collapse of the very first KSA in 1818 by the Egyptian army sent by the governor of Egypt at the time, Muhammad Ali Pacha, led by his son Ibrahim Pacha,  under the Ottomans' orders. Egypt was the indirect agent causing the collapse of the second KSA by inciting internal strife, conflicts, and disputes among emirs and governors of regions of Arabia, again under the supervision of the Ottomans. Hence, Abdul-Aziz realized that the fate of his burgeoning kingdom is directly linked to the two most – and only – powerful regional powers: Iran and Egypt. Let alone the international power, GB, which had great influence in the whole of the Middle East at the time. Thus, Abdul-Aziz had to win over GB to his side and to convert Egyptians from Sunnite Sufism dominant at the time to the Sunnite Wahabi Ibn Hanbal religion. Of course, the political conditions and circumstances of Egypt and of the international powers helped Abdul-Aziz to achieve such goals, and above all, the discovery of oil in the KSA aided him a great deal. When Abdul-Aziz made sure that Egypt and GB were on his side and supported his KSA, he felt that conditions were settled in his kingdom; he could keep off any Shiite threat inside the KSA and around its borders. In brief, the Middle East has but two main poles: Iran and Egypt, while countries in the middle between both poles (i.e., Arabia, the Levant, and Iraq) are located within the frame of political and religious competition between both poles. That was whyAbdul-Aziz endeavored – and succeeded – to make Egypt as the strategic depth of the KSA, and then, he made pacts with his allies (i.e., GB and, later on, the USA). Thus, among the staples of the Saudi foreign policies, above anything else, are to win over Egypt and the USA to the side of KSA in all times. Yet, this staple was jeopardized when Nasserite Egypt emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, when President Gamal Abdel-Nasser ruled Egypt, and his Nasserist ideology of Pan-Arabism that oriented Egypt to assume leadership of the Arab world. Future evidence will reveal that the Saudi hands, during the reign of Feisal, were behind the setbacks of Nasserite Egypt in order to retrieve Egypt into the Saudi Wahabi orbit and under American influence when Sadat succeeded Abdel-Nasser in the 1970s. Historically, reading political events in Egypt from 1976 to 2000, we conclude that the KSA has benefited politically from Egypt, to the disadvantage of Egyptians. Thus, the KSA has benefited from the Egyptian strategic depth during the Egyptian monarchy epoch before 1952, and then, this depth caused great alarm and posed as a threat during the 950s and the 1960s. Upon the death of Abdul-Nasser in 1970, the KSA has taken advantage of Egypt to lead the Arab and Islamic world, manipulating Egyptian strategic depth and making use of an impoverished Egypt after the 1973 war. The KSA managed to subjugate Egypt in the political, religious, and cultural domains. To quote an example: let us not forget that the KSA drew benefits from the 1973 war despite the fact that it never participated in it; oil prices soared up high in the KSA and its royal family gained billions of US$ without efforts, whereas Egypt was on the brink of bankruptcy. The Open-Door policy of Sadat made the Saudis culturally and religiously able to invade Egypt, buying Egyptian minds and bodies of Egyptian women. It is infuriating to imagine how such results occurred via blood of Egyptian martyrs of the 1973 war! It was unprecedented in history that a victorious nation, like the Egyptians in 1973, would turn some of its male citizens into workers and servants of another nation, i.e., the Saudis, and reduce some of its female citizens into slave-like existence in clandestine marriages with male Saudis or without marriage at all as sex-slaves to the Saudi tourists. The beneficiaries here, in the KSA, never fought in the 1973 war, but they gained the fruits of such victory to be leader of all Arabs in the Arab world countries and leader of the Islamic world countries instead of Egypt. The KSA has intentionally forgotten the Wahabi, Salafist theology of Ibn Taymiyya about Rikaz zakat; Rikaz is the theological term about zakat alms/charity from revenues gained from whatever extracted from inside the earth, like oil of course, and the rate of Rikaz zakat is one fifth of the revenues to be given to the poor, in that case, to be given to the poor Muslims from Bangladesh to Somalia! Islamic justice should have made the KSA give Egypt it share from the revenues of oil (Egypt deserve about half of it from 1974 until now, in retrospect) whose prices soared up in 1974; instead, the exact opposite occurred: the Saudis bought minds, manpower, and bodies of male and female Egyptians with the lowest prices possible. The Saudis at the time dealt with Egyptians with a backward mentality of enslavement. Things went upside down; Egypt used to control Hejaz and the Levant for centuries as vital points of strategic depth of the Egyptian State, and in the 20th century, Egypt is under the control of Najd, a region in Arabia that was never of much consequence to anyone. In sum, the KSA has dominated the Egyptian strategic depth and made use of it to spread and propagate its Wahabi culture and to dwarf the secular, Shiite, and Sufi cultures in Egypt and the Arab world at large. Despite any feelings of fury an Egyptian reader would feel when reading the previous lines, and despite the dire consequences of this strange Saudi invasion of Egyptian mainstream culture, this Saudi influence is a historical exception of the permanent rule that will never be wiped out: originally, east of Arabia strategically follows Iran (the eastern pole of the Middle East), and the west of Arabia strategically follows Egypt (the western pole of the Middle East). As for Najd, it fluctuates between the two poles, as it is in cultural debate and conflict with Iraqi borders and borders of the Levant. Both the Levant and Iraq strategically follow both Iran, within its western borders, and Egypt, within its eastern borders. Historically, Iraq and the Levant suffered raids, savagery, and backwardness of Najd. We must remember that this permanent rule had two exceptions in history: 1) Arab conquests led by the Qorayish tribe, and whose armies consisted mainly of Najd dwellers, among other regions submitted to Qorayish after wars of the caliph Abou Bakr, the very first caliph/ruler. 2) When oil was discovered after Abdul-Aziz unified Arabia under his rule as he established the third, current KSA. Within exceptional conditions in the first case, Qorayish tribe ruled Egypt within the pre-Umayyad caliphs and within the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. Revolts sprang from desert-Arabs and Bedouins who tried to take over the rule, in the names of Al-Khawarij, Al-Zanj, and the Qarmatians, and in all such cases, the capital of the Arab caliphate was a developed city, not part of deserts, such as Damascus and Baghdad. Thus, revolting groups at the time had to move into modern, civilized areas of centuries-old cities to begin their revolts. In other words, they had to move themselves into the eastern pole, Iran, even in its neighbor: Iraq. As for Egypt, it was a dependent region under the Umayyad rule based in Damascus, but in the Second Abbasid Era, Egypt grew more independent and enjoyed partial self-rule and nominal influence of the Abbasid caliphate for a while, and it was ruled independently away from the Abbasids by the Shiite Fatimids. The Shiite capital in Egypt, Cairo, competed with the Sunnite Abbasid capital, Baghdad. Even the Shiite Fatimid sultan and sheikhs reached Iraq and delivered sermons in mosque of Baghdad at one point during the revolt of Al-Basasiri. Thus, in all cases, political disputes and conflicts in Arabia always had to be linked and related to the two poles: Egypt and Iran, away from Arabian deserts. Historically, all revolts initiated in Hejaz to restore its former stature as the center of caliphate, in Yathreb, failed miserably for centuries, despite the religious and historical vital importance of the Hejaz region as it contains the cities of Mecca and Yathreb. This is exemplified in revolts in Hejaz initiated by "Abdullah Ibn Al-Zubayr" during the Umayyad caliphate and that initiated by "Muhammad Al-Nafs Al-Zakiyya" during the early years of Abbasid caliphate. It was clear to everyone, since the Arab conquests era, that historically and politically, the role of Arabia is to be subordinate and subservient to the rich, civilized, ancient two poles of the Middles East: Iran and Egypt, and that the ambitious ones among Arabian men who sought wealth must direct their raids and/or conquests to these two poles, and if ever succeeded, their connection with Arabia would dissolve. Historical accounts tell us so about Mu'aweiya Ibn Abou Sufyan and his descendants (i.e., the Umayyad Dynasty) especially in Andalusia (Spain) and the Abbasid Dynasty in Baghdad and in Cairo during the Mameluke Era later on after the fall of Baghdad. The role of Arabia in the past centuries was to raid and loot within its borders and beyond them, whether such raiders carried a certain religious ideology or not, until Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud managed to establish his Sunnite Wahabi kingdom. When the Najd Brothers under Abdul-Aziz tried to repeat the military expansion beyond borders of the KSA, they failed miserably and failed to revolt against their king. Oil was discovered in the kingdom in a historical breakthrough that allowed the Saudi influence to peacefully spread insidiously within Egypt very fast in a relatively short time, and throughout the Islamic world at large later on and even within Muslim minorities in the east and the West countries. Yet, oil revenues and influence do not change the permanent strategic rule we have mentioned above; rather, they confirm it. we assert here that the Saudi political influence over Egypt and other countries is a temporary stage; things will return to its stable circumstances and conditions as per the permanent rule sooner or later, with Iran and Egypt controlling the Middle East as before. Arabia, sooner or later, will return to its original role as subservient and subordinate to Iran and Egypt. Elderly Saudi citizens still remember the Egyptian Kiswah caravans that brought annually the expensive cloth for the Kaaba, alms for the poor, and money sums to help local Arab sheikhs and leaders working under Egypt that controlled Najd at the time. Let us bear in mind that the international power on which the KSA relies; i.e., the USA, will NOT remain forever dominant over the countries of the planet; the American hegemony and dominance are linked to how much oil is confiscated by the USA from the KSA, as done since the Gulf War and its consequences until now. The USA will certainly use up all the remainder of the Saudi oil within a few decades, and most probably the USA will confiscate the Saudi money in its banks, and at a certain point, the Saudi royal family will not be of much consequence or importance to the American foreign policy. That is, the USA will reject and forsake the Saudi royal family once a crisis occurs, or even because of being fed up with such a family, or just for the sake of change. What about cases of American soldiers suffering dangers in the future akin to what occurred in Somalia or Beirut? This might occur as long as there is much international resentment against the USA foreign policies, especially because of the USA being the chief ally of Israeli Zionism amidst Arab regimes subservient to the USA. Such conditions will give momentum to the emergence of more and new opposition movements in the KSA that will pose a threat to the interests of the USA and its military bases. Hence, the Viet Nam complex would drive Uncle Sam to leave the region and let the Saudi royal family face its fate. Hence, what Abdul-Aziz had set in his regional policies (about the Egyptian strategic depth) and his international policies (allying himself to GB and alter on to the USA) and what the KSA adopted as foreign policies later on after the discovery of oil in Arabia asserted the permanent rule we have mentioned above. The KSA will not be able to use any plans, plots, or strategies if the kingdom is shaken violently from within by new opposition movements, especially by the Shiites in Al-Ahsa linking themselves to Iran, the eastern pole, and to the rest of the Shiites in the Islamic world, and by the Sufis inside and outside the KSA if they to unite themselves against the KSA.


– 2 –


  Egypt is the very first and most ancient central state in human history that still stands today, chiefly because of the River Nile, which entailed a strong, powerful central regime/rule to protect and care for irrigation and agricultural activities and to build systems and establishments to preserve stability of Egypt as an agricultural country. Such stability allowed belonging to the homeland to begin with one's village, province, and eventually to Egypt. Such belonging to one's homeland had exceeded one's loyalty to one's family; as the State had undertaken the defense of one's land, houses, possessions, and family. The central Egyptian State in certain points in history expanded southwards within the reach of its influence, until the sources of the Nile and some ports in Somalia and Eritrea. The Egyptian influence and expansions in many points in history reached the whole Levant, parts of Iraq and Asia Minor, during the Mameluke Era and the reign of Muhammad Ali Pacha. Iran has some historical similarities as in the Egyptian case; before the Arab conquest of Persia, the Persian empire competed with the Byzantines militarily, and the Persian influence and expansions reached at some points Asia Minor, Iraq, the Levant, and Egypt itself. Once grown tired and weak because of wars against the Byzantines, Persia fell into the hands of Arab conquerors to be a mere province, like Egypt, in the Arab Empire. Persians played a major role in crushing the Umayyad caliphate and in establishing the Abbasid one, with the latter being controlled by Persians for several decades until the collapse of the Abbasids by the Moghuls who invaded Persia, Iraq, and the Levant. The Abbasid caliphate had to move into Cairo, the Egyptian capital. We conclude from such historical facts that the two major regional poles in the Middle East, Iran and Egypt, are real, stable, and ongoing States for centuries until now, and countries between the two poles are temporary ones that rise and collapse and change continuously. Of course, political upheavals, unrest, and instability of Iraq and the Levant are not caused only by their being situated between the two major powerful poles. Iran and Egypt; there are other reasons: the fertile soil of the Levant and Mesopotamia lacks the natural barriers that would ward off and deter Najd Bedouin raids who for centuries kept raiding cities located near the southern borders of the Levant and Iraq for loot. Bedouins could not possibly direct their raids to Egypt, which is naturally protected by barriers like the Red Sea, Hejaz mountains by the Red Sea coast, and Red Sea mountains within Egypt itself. Of course, Bedouins could not possibly direct their raids to Iran, as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf nations prevented such course of action. Besides, both Egypt and Iran had the ability at the time to deter Bedouins' raids if some desert-Arabs would have infiltrated into their lands, even in times of weakness and deterioration. Thus, the south areas of Iraq and the Levant were inevitably the main scene of Bedouin raids for loot. Apart from raids, there were immigration waves of Arabian tribes into Mesopotamia that led to more turmoil and sectarian strife in this region which was the crossroads of many races, cultures, and creeds. That is why Mesopotamia (today's Iraq) has its pluralistic nature and diversity of many races, cultures, and religions. Such factors led to the erection and collapse of several temporary states and city-states, which rose and fell according to various local, regional, and international conditions and circumstances. Let us bear in mind that the map of the countries we know now as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan is drawn by a British officer named Mark Sykes and a French one named François Georges-Picot, within the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. Despite establishing such countries with defined borders acknowledged internationally, instability reigns supreme in the Levant and Iraq because of many coups and shifting loyalties. For tens of centuries, Iraq and the Levant region countries never knew the notion of a state stable within certain borders that lasted long enough to make one belonging to a homeland more than to one's tribe, clan, family, sect, doctrine, creed, or denomination. The opposite is true in Egypt and Iran (Persia). Even the democratic Lebanon is an example consolidating out view; its democracy is for clans, tribes, and sects and heads/leaders of each of those, and loyalty is for those three, and not for Lebanon as a country. When leaders disputed at one point in history, Lebanon was about to get lost during the civil war in the 20th century. The geopolitical nature of "Mesopotamia and the Levant" has no natural insurmountable barriers between both regions and the two poles (Egypt and Iran) on one hand, and between Mesopotamia and the Levant and Bedouins of Arabia on the other hand. Lacking insuperable barriers, Mesopotamia and the Levant is a region located amidst immigration waves coming from the north and the east. This geopolitical nature led to mosaic-like cultural pluralism of tribes, clans, denominations, and ethnicities, despite the fact that the majority speaks the Arabic tongue and embrace Islam. Sadly, this mosaic of various ethnicities and cultures led to more doctrinal divisions inside each religious denomination or sect inside what we call now Islam and Christianity. There are many sects that call themselves Shiites and so many other sects deeming themselves as Sunnites, apart from several Christian denominations. More divisions are caused by ethnicities, tribalism, and races: there are tribal factions' disputes and conflicts, and there are Kurds of cities and those of mountains, Syriac Christians, Assyrians, etc. as well as waves of immigrants like Armenians and Circassians. Geopolitical conditions worsened in Mesopotamia and the Levant when crusaders in the past and Zionists in the present established their theocracies, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement exacerbated matters in Mesopotamia and the Levant that redistributed and re-divided the region as per interests of Zionists, GB, and France, not taking into consideration any national interests of local dwellers of the region of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Hence, coups, tyrannical regimes, political unrest, upheavals, and turmoil go on in Iraq and the Levant. We remind our readers that this digression is closely linked to the topic of our book here about the KSA; this digression shows clearly that there are so many time-bombs or mines within the northern Saudi borders in Mesopotamia and the Levant that might move into Arabia anytime to denote there. More mines and time-bombs were caused by desert-Arabs and Bedouins of Najd in their raids and immigration waves into the north that caused more trouble and unrest in Iraq and the Levant. Such unrest has prevented the establishment of stable, unified, continuous states similar to that in Iran and Egypt. Thus, Iran and Egypt has remained and will remain the only two powerful poles in the Middle East, with Arabia, Mesopotamia, and the Levant as regions subservient and subordinate to them as a permanent rule.                               



– 3 –


  As for Arabia, it is a more difficult area to be unified as one state, except with tyranny and oppression. The Hejaz region is open to the world for trade and religious tourism (pilgrimage), and it could not possibly be compatible with the closed Najd region that retains centuries-old Middle-Ages view of the world. Historically, relations between Najd and Hejaz were bad for centuries. Arabs of Yemen and the Gulf region preferred keeping to their coasts for living, travel, trade, etc. and kept good relations with countries in Asia, especially the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia, and such Arabs took no interest in Najd, Iraq, and the Levant. As for the inside of Arabian deserts, loyalties vary as per tribal factions and intertribal relations; each tribe seemed to be a mobile city-state, to which a Bedouin belonged. Tribes in general never submit to any State except by military force, oppression, and tyrannical power, as we know from writings of Ibn Khaldoun and his views about tribal fanaticism; please refer to our book, published on our website, titled "A Historical Study of ''The Introduction'': A Book Authored by Ibn Khaldoun". Oppression in Arabia finds justification under the banner and motto of ''jihad'' to justify expansion, invasion, massacres, fighting, and looting. Thus, the Saudi family members, despite being a few persons, managed to subjugate a large number of powerful tribes all over Arabia and to impose on them Wahabism as the only ''true'' form of Islam; a dangerous falsehood of course. Soon enough, the Saudi family gave its name to the lands and regions unified in the name of the KSA, thus omitting regional names in which others took pride like ''Hejaz'', "Najran", ''Aseer'', ''Tehama'', and ''Al-Ahsa''. In addition to oppression, tyranny, and compulsion to convert to Wahabism, the Saudi royal family has controlled oil revenues, and thinks arrogantly that a ruler owns land and its inhabitants as per Sunnite Middle-Ages jurisprudence and theology. Such Wahabi ideology does not fit in and is not compatible with the 20th century culture of human rights. Thus, the KSA had to undertake some ideological changes in the Wahabi thought, but the problem was that opposition movement against the Saudi royal family sprang forth from inside the Wahabi ideology itself, by people who claim to be ''more religious'' and ''nearer'' to Wahabism that Al-Saud family. Of course such a claim was a façade to cover the ardent desire of the foes of Al-Saud to settle old accounts. Usually, a Bedouin never forgets his vendetta and his desire to take revenge; there are several tribesmen who sought revenge from Al-Saud family. Hence, dangers that might pose a threat to divide the KSA begin with repulsion and discordance between the geographical regions of the kingdom: Hejaz, Najd, Aseer, and the Eastern region (including Al-Ahsa). Loyalty to one's tribe is the priority, before one's country in that case, especially when one family, Al-Saud, confiscates all wealth and power and authority, allowing only a small margin of them to its minions loyal to the royal family. This Saudi state imposes its Wahabi ideology by force, coercion, and compulsion on those who do not accept it inside the KSA: such as Shiites, Sufis, and those who claim to be descendants of Ali Ibn Abou Talib: the Al-Sharif family. The KSA cannot possibly let go of Wahabism anytime; as a state, it derives its alleged legitimacy from such ideology. The Saudi repeated declaration that its legitimacy is derived from conquests by the sword to ''retrieve'' the kingdom of the Saudi ancestors is dangerous enough; this implies the right of others outside the royal family to revolt and rebel against by the sword (or other arms) as well to ''retrieve'' their lost freedom, honor, and possessions before the emergence of Al-Saud family. The most dangerous source of threat that might lead to the division of the KSA is its Shiite minority, which includes the Al-Sharif family, the victims of the KSA past and present. This minority is the ally of the eastern pole: Iran. Another danger that poses a threat to divide the KSA is the royal family itself; its members are now so many, and each with his ever-growing privileges that cause disputes among such members, who live in luxury and opulence that sap their vitality since the third generation. Let us remember that oil revenues made this royal family and the citizens jump suddenly from the Bedouin stage to the stage of opulence and luxurious standard of living, without gradual phases between both stages to allow room for civilizational maturity to make citizens cope with quick cultural changes and modernization. Hence, this huge leap was sudden; citizens during the reign of Abdul-Aziz considered the wireless and telegrams as diabolical and satanic devices, and their sons now use the internet and embrace the ideas of Ibn Abdul-Wahab and Ibn Taymiyya. It is expected that modern technology will be misused in the KSA, in an age of mixing luxury with Wahabi backwardness. This problem aggravates in the cases of filthily rich people and the royal family; this applies to most rich Arabs in the oil-rich countries in the Gulf region. Hence, oil revenues turn by Arab rulers into weapons and arms to allow Arabs to kill and fight one another, on behalf of the white men (or WASPs) in the USA and Israel. This is part of the heavy price paid for opulence and luxury when mixed with backwardness and lack of civilization. The Gulf War is a good example showing this Arab folly. Within such internal and external dangers that threaten the future of the third, current KSA, no grandchildren of Abdul-Aziz bear his traits that allowed him to establish his kingdom amidst certain various impossibilities. We predict that the next age will witness imminent collapse of the third KSA, similar to the end of the second KSA, when princes and the royal household members engaged in countless conflicts and disputes which would not be settled. Another possibility is that one, or both, of the two regional poles, Egypt and Iran, would interfere to bring about the downfall of the KSA, similar to the end of the first KSA in 1818. The third, current KSA has use oil revenues to buy the Egyptian strategic depth for itself; yet, dangers still murk inside the oil-rich Eastern region (including Al-Ahsa), located near Iran, the eastern regional pole. This research ends with this recommendation to avoid bloodshed of Arabs and Muslims and to clear the name of Islam from accusations of terrorism and extremism that have tarnished its name: we hope that the KSA and the rest of the Arab regimes and the Islamic non-Arab countries would apply Islamic justice and human rights, which are preached in the Quran centuries before the West countries formed, applied, and called for them. This way, the KSA would protect itself from collapse and downfall. The required remedy is the intellectual project of religious reform preached by the writer of these lines, who suffered persecution in Egypt because of the KSA on several occasions, as we have mentioned in the introduction to this book.                                



Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour

26th of June, 2001, Cairo, Egypt.

The Wahabi Opposition Movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Twentieth Century
The Wahabi Opposition Movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Twentieth Century

Authored by: Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour
26th of June, 2001
Cairo, Egypt
Translated by: Ahmed Fathy


We publish here the complete book titled "The Wahabi Opposition Movements in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Twentieth Century", after writing it previously in a series of successive articles before on our website. We authored this book in 2001, and it is published here online after omitting an introductory chapter about Wahabism and its origins and roots; we have omitted this chapter because it repeats what we have written in hundreds of articles about Wahabism, Salafism, and the Sunnite Ibn Hanbal doctrine. We have decided to confine this book to the rest of this research, whose details are summarized in the new introduction, and we consider this research or book as adopting a neutral historical viewpoint of events. Parts of this book have been published before separate