Patheos: Syria's Christians Face the Specter of Civil War and Sectarian Violence

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Stateof Fear : Syria ' sChristians Face the Specter of Civil War and Sectarian Violence

Will theendangered Christian communities of the Middle East survive?

By KurtJ. Werthmuller, February 03, 2012

Editor ' s Note: This is a partof a multi-part series on Christians in the Middle East .See Dr. Werthmuller ' s comments onEgypt here and here, as well as his introduction to the series.

On a hill above the ancient, well-wornroute between Aleppo and the Syria border with Turkey , one can easily tramp up tothe ruins of what was once a massive basilica complex from Late Antiquity. Thenow-dilapidated Byzantine structure was originally built around the site of oneof the most colorful and influential figures of 5th-century Christianity:Simeon the Stylite, who spent decades—literally—sitting atop astone pillar to demonstrate his ascetic commitment to Christ. One could easilyread within these sad and magnificent ruins a broader symbolism of the fadinglight of Syrian Christianity, largely forgotten, or perhaps ignored, byChristians elsewhere in the world. To do so with mere resignation, however, isto commit the common mistake of valuing the Middle East only for itsantiquities, instead of turning our eyes to those millions of Christ ' s followers who remain in Syria, comprising some 10percent of the nation ' s 20 millioninhabitants—and who are at particular risk from the current chaosenveloping the country.

Recognizingthe unique religious diversity of Syrian society is the key to understandingthe precarious position of the nation ' sChristian community amidst the present crisis. Since the Middle Ages, thevaried geography of Syria ,like its smaller Lebanese neighbor to the west (which were not separatepolitical entities until less than a century ago), has tended to attract thesettlement of religious sects on the fringes of "mainstream" (e.g.,Sunni Arab) Middle Eastern society. In this context, the Sunni majoritysurrounds not just one ethnic or religious minority—unlike the context ofthe Egyptian Copts—but rather a whole series of historically marginalizedcommunities: Kurds, Druzes, Alawis, Circassians, Ismailis, and others. In Syria , these groups could find isolation whennecessary, like Mt. Druze , but still make useof the country ' s busy commercialroutes, bustling urban centers, and fertile countryside.

Christianshad understood this dynamic even before the 7th-century Islamic conquests,after which bilad al-sham("the northern lands," or Greater Syria) came to represent theborderlands between Muslim and Byzantine rule. Assyrians, Armenians,Nestorians, and other Christian sects had been on the outs with Constantinoplesince the Council of Chalcedon in 451, and many of them sought refuge in thehills of Syria .They were joined by followers of the Greek Orthodox Church, still the largestproportion of Syria ' s Christians, and its smaller Greek Catholic(Melkite) offshoot that declared loyalty with Rome in the 18th century.

Thesecommunities suffered much over the centuries, from their precarious position inthe line of fire during the Crusading era, to the ravages of the Mongolinvasion in the 13th century, to painful Ottoman attempts to transition tomodernity in the 19th century (which unsuccessfully tried to replace confessionalidentity with citizenship, to much controversy). But Syrian Christians alsofound opportunities to prosper as well: like the Maronites of Lebanon, theyshared in the interests of European merchants who sought to trade with theirco-religionists in the Levant . It is worthnoting that these perceived economic advantages over Syrian Muslims served asthe most important catalyst for outbreaks of anti-Christian violence in theearly modern era.

By the20th century, Christians shared with their Muslim and other neighbors in thetumultuous emergence of Syria as a modern nation-state, from the collapse ofOttoman power in 1920, which had ruled there since the 16th century,to the process of independence from post-WWI French mandate authorities between1936 and 1944, and beyond the humiliating defeat by the newly-created State of Israelin 1948. In the midst of these events, Syrian Christians were among the mostinfluential writers and ideologues of the day: George Antonius, aBritish-Syrian diplomat who wrote The Arab Awakening in 1938, and Michel Aflaq,who co-founded the Arab Socialist Ba ' athParty in 1947, were among those who picked up the earlier work of Syrianjournalists in articulating and fueling the burgeoning Arab Nationalistmovement. This was a matter of ideological commitment, but also of inclusion:for many Syrian Christian intellectuals of the era, Pan-Arabism was a way ofhighlighting and translating into political reality an Arab cultural identity (despite its shakyfoundations) over a specifically religiousone that has traditionally excluded non-Muslim minorities.

In a sense,this cultural and ideological link proved to be integral to the Christiancommunity ' s eventual cooperationwith the Syrian Ba ' ath regime,especially following its Alawi takeover under the rule of Hafez al-Asad in theearly 1970s. The Alawis belong to a heterodox and insular offshoot of Shi'iIslam, comprising roughly 12 percent of the country ' spopulation; after centuries of uneasy relations with the Sunni majority (whichlargely regarded them as heretics), many of their leaders and members of themilitary eagerly committed to the secular, socialist vision of the Ba ' ath Party. So it was that Asad, an Alawi and an airforce officer himself, had a built-in network prepared to support hisauthoritarian takeover of military-political rule in 1970—a network heutilized to successfully stack the higher echelons of his regime and militarywith fellow Alawis. But he also fostered cooperative relations with othernon-Sunnis throughout the country; perhaps the Sunni majority would have to becontrolled by the use or threat of force, but Christians and others could beco-opted by exchanging all political freedom for protection and anunprecedented degree of religious freedom.

(I canattest to this state of affairs myself. During my first of several visits to Syria , this one in 1997, I happened to be in thecity of Aleppo for Easter Sunday. I was visiting from Egypt , where I lived at the timeand where Copts were typically seen but not heard, so I was amazed to hear theringing of church bells and to find a Syriac Easter liturgy broadcasting overloudspeakers to overflow congregants in the city streets!)

Sincethen, the leaders of the nation ' sChristian communities have typically remained vocal in their support of theAsad regime, including its transfer to Hafez al-Asad ' sson Bashar in 2000. This has only been reinforced as a trend of Islamicconservatism has steadily grown across the Arab world over the last quarter-century,and the staunchly secular Asad regime has convinced the nation ' s Christians—with enough of an element oftruth to be convincing—that it stood between them and a new era ofIslamist domination and a loss of their religious freedom. As in much of the MiddleEast, those Christians who found their country ' sstate of affairs and regime ' s severepolitical oppression too steep a cost to bear have simply migrated, most oftento the U.S. and Europe .

ThisFaustian cooperation has had its costs: when anti-regime protests began inMarch 2011, and the regime responded with shocking brutality, Christian leaderswere left to uncomfortably maintain the party line regarding Bashar al-Asad ' s continuing legitimacy. In truth, we have almostno idea as to what average Syrian Christians outside of church leadership thinkabout the uprising (now waged by an awkward mixture of peaceful activists andarmed defectors from the military), or how many of them have participated inanti-regime demonstrations (and some likely have). After all, information istightly restricted in and out of the country at the moment, and almost allforeign press coverage of the Syrian chaos is conducted from neighboring Lebanon and Turkey , or from regime-guidedtours.

Onerecent episode clearly illustrates this situation. On January 9th,Arab League monitors who were sent to assess the Syrian chaos on the ground attended aGreek Orthodox mass in Damascus memorializing a boy who was killed in the city of Homs in the chaos of local violence. Thesemonitors were not invited there simply to pay respects: they were guided andescorted to the church by regime officials for whom the event reinforced itsnarrative of security and public support in the face of anarchy and terrorism.Syrian Christians have thus found themselves in an increasingly untenableposition: they are caught between a minority-friendly and yet oppressivedictatorship; a mass uprising that is brave and legitimate, but with a growingarmed faction; and the feared possibilities of sectarian violence in theshort-term, and Islamist rule in the long-term.

In lightof this poisoned atmosphere, we do know for certain that many of Syria ' s Christians are simply terrified. Part of this isa fear shared by many Syrians together, of a quickly growing threat ofunrestrained civil war. Part of this is also reserved for the potential ofsectarian retaliation, in the wake of civil war and a breakdown of order: willSunni militias (not average Sunni townsfolk, who are most interested insurviving and protecting their loved ones as well) seek to exact revenge onAsad ' s Alawi community and theirperceived allies, such as Christians? And if the regime falls, willIslamists—an unknown quantity in the equation at the moment, but a likely part of a post-Asad Syria—move to stripnon-Muslims of their long-held religious freedoms? Both of these scenarios aredeeply troubling to many of the nation ' sChristians.

While itis increasingly impossible for the global community to justify leaving room forthe Asad regime to remain in power, following months of atrocities and wellover 5,000 dead, we must also be keenly aware of the precarious position inwhich Syria ' s religious minorities, especially its Christians,are now placed. They are in urgent need of the United States and other nations toform a coherent, immediate, and intentionalresponse to the threats looming over them as we speak. And they are indesperate need of your prayers.

Kurt J. Werthmuller is a researchfellow at the Hudson Institute ' sCenter for Religious Freedom. He is the author of Coptic Identity and Ayyubid Politics in Egypt , 1218-1250,and he holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern history from the University of California , Santa Barbara (2007), an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University (2002), and a B.A. in history from Messiah College (1995).

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