Palaces Won't Suffice: Corruption in Emomali Rahmon's Tajikistan
اضيف الخبر في يوم الثلاثاء ٠٩ - يوليو - ٢٠١٣ ١٢:٠٠ صباحاً.
Palaces Won't Suffice: Corruption in Emomali Rahmon's Tajikistan
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Palaces Won't Suffice: Corruption in Emomali Rahmon's Tajikistan
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Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan.
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Nargiz, a schoolteacher, describes her lack of interest in Tajikistan's presidential election, which will occur in November this year. "I don't care," she says repeatedly. This is surprising. I have heard Nargiz criticize President Emomali Rahmon many times. He has been in office since 1994. Surely, it is time for a change. Even if the change is unlikely, it is time to hope for a change.
Nargiz's weary response: "We do not want to pay for any more palaces." Based on her experience, any Tajik president will build palaces for his family members, and the Tajik people will pay for them. After almost twenty years in power, Rahmon has amassed a fortune thought in the billions of dollars.[2] By now, he has finished building palaces for his relatives. To elect a different president would mean starting all over again.
This conception of the presidential office is rooted in the nepotism that has defined Rahmon's tenure, a self-enriching cycle in which the political and economic promotion of family members serves their interests, while placing them to return the favor. With seven daughters, two sons, and a network of in-laws, Rahmon has extended his family's influence into all sectors of Tajik life. Among their possessions are a football club, shops, boutiques, banks and TV channels. They hold positions including Minister of Energy and Industry, Tajik Railways Company Director, Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Finance Minister. Rahmon's son Rustam is Head of Customs' anti-smuggling department, prompting suspicions that Rahmon is less concerned with curtailing smuggling than protecting his family's profits from it.[3] Unsurprisingly, a 2011 government initiative to eradicate nepotism has been met with skepticism.
In Rahmon's Tajikistan, as elsewhere, nepotism and corruption are mutually reinforcing. This is the case with Talco, the Tajikistan Aluminum Company, with annual revenue estimated at USD1 billion.[4] Although Talco is state-owned, evidence suggests that its profits benefit Rahmon, to whom its director reports directly (the company "lacks meaningful corporate governance"[5]). In 2008, Talco initiated a lawsuit in London High Court, incurring expenses that cost Tajikistan almost five percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [6] until an out-of-court settlement. The court documents showed that Talco had embezzled some USD1 billion between 2005 and 2008 and that this money had gone to an offshore account in the Virgin Islands.[7] Further suggesting a redirection of funds, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported in 2007 that Tajikistan was only receiving one fourth of the standard international price for its aluminum.[8] In a 2010 interview with Radio Ozodi[9], nobody in the Ministry of Economic Development would comment on where, precisely, Talco's profits were going. Analyst Rahmatillo Valiev explains this silence by noting that Talco is "under the Tajik president and its activities are controlled by the presidential office."[10]
The prime suspect in Talco's missing funds is Talco Management Ltd. (TML), through which Talco conducts its purchases of the raw material alumina and its sales of aluminum. TML is registered in the Virgin Islands, but the specifics of its ownership and operations remain murky. Although the IMF has called for an audit of TML, TML's status as a private company means that the IMF is unable to compel it to conduct an audit. Luc Moers of the IMF noted that although TML is officially private, it is, in fact, run by the Tajik government, which could and should call for an audit.[11] The government has not complied.
In addition to his control of Talco, Rahmon is connected to TML through his brother-in-law, Hasan Asadullozoda. Asadullozoda is the CEO of the powerful Orienbank, which formally owns TML.[12] Asadullozoda rose from his job as a gas station attendant through his ties to Rahmon, and is currently one of the most prominent businessmen in Tajikistan. If anyone knows the truth about TML, it is Asadullozoda, and he was summoned as a witness in the London trial. However, Asadullozoda's role in TML was obscured by his abrupt disappearance on May 2, 2008.
One theory about Asadullozoda's disappearance is that he hid to avoid testifying in court. Another is that Rahmon wanted to keep him quiet and held him somewhere. Others believe that there was a family feud and Asadullozoda was shot non-fatally by Rahmon's son Rustam, or that Rustam killed him. The government claims Asadullozoda was unwell and that he has since recovered. However, recent sightings of Asadullozada have not been unambiguous enough to resolve doubts about whether he is alive. It is even rumored that he has a twin brother who is impersonating him. Whatever the truth behind Asadullozoda's strange story, continued corruption in TML remains certain. Freedom House found that of the profits generated by Tajik aluminum in 2011, "only a small fraction … returned to the national budget."[13]
Theft from Talco is particularly troubling in light of the fact that Talco, by consuming about 43 percent of Tajikistan's electricity,[14] contributes to the country's persistent energy problem. The World Bank estimates that 70 percent of the population suffers from "excessive shortages" in the winter,[15] with effects that include factories and schools shutting, and hospitals losing power.[16] Despite the problems stemming from its high power usage, Talco receives its electricity at a bargain price from the state-owned electricity company.[17] Sherali Gul (Minister of Energy and Rahmon relative) is unlikely to reconsider the current arrangement.
Talco's drain on the power grid serves as a microcosm of Rahmon's parasitic effect on the economy. Under his leadership, Tajikistan ranked 157 out of 176 countries in Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index" in 2012.[18] Neighbors like Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have more pervasive corruption than Tajikistan, but their scores are improving, while Tajikistan's have gotten worse.[19] Because it creates unfair competition, corruption discourages private investment in Tajikistan.[20] In the World Bank's analysis, Tajikistan's "low rates of private investment," which have "stagnated" at around five percent of GDP, are stunting its economy.[21] Tajikistan remains one of the poorest countries in Central Asia, with a GDP per capita of USD2,200 in 2012.[22] Some one million Tajiks have sought employment in Russia, and the National Bank of Tajikistan estimated that remittances in 2012 accounted for over 45 percent of official GDP.[23] Most of the young Tajik people I met could not imagine a future in their homeland.
When it comes to Rahmon's priorities, Nargiz's cynicism is, if anything, too limited. Rahmon's relatives may all have their palaces, but there are no signs that his appetite for wealth is flagging. Nargiz believes that any replacement of Rahmon would be equally corrupt, and with emptier coffers to refill. Even so, given the proven reality of Rahmon's aims and methods, it is disheartening to imagine that November's election will fail to produce even the possibility of an alternative.
Catherine Ambler is a former teacher in Tajikistan.
Notes
[1] I have changed her name.
[2] "Dictators and their wealth: Emomali Rahmon," http://money.ca.msn.com/savings-debt/gallery/dictators-and-their-wealth?page=10
[3] "Tajik President's Son Will Tackle Customs Crime," http://www.neweurasia.net/business-and-economics/tajik-president%E2%80%99s-son-will-tackle-customs-crime/%20(Mar.%2014,%202011)
[4] BTI 2010: Tajikistan Country Report, http://www.bti2010.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/157.0.html
[6] John Helmer, "Tajik Aluminum becomes shooting match," http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF19Ag02.html
[7] Sofia Wickberg, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Tajikistan, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/356_Overview_of_Corruption_in_Tajikistan.pdf
[8] John Helmer, "Cover Off Tajikistan's missing millions," http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JA11Dj02.html
[9] Radio Ozodi is the Dushanbe branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
[10] Zulfiqar Ismoilion, "Корхонаи Талко ба буҷаи кишвар чӣ медиҳад?" ("How Much Does the Talco Plant Give the Budget?"), http://www.ozodi.org/content/article/2112697.html
[11] "СБП хостори бозрасии фаъолияти 'Талко Менеҷмент'" ("IMF Seeking Inspection of 'Talco Management'"), http://www.bbc.co.uk/tajik/news/2010/06/100625_mm_imf.shtml
[12] BTI 2012: Tajikistan Country Report, http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/pse/tjk/ .
[13] Tajikistan, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/tajikistan
[14] BTI 2010: Tajikistan Country Report.
[15] Amanda Lanzillo, "Rogun Dam Promises Energy Security," http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/13/rogun-dam-promises-energy-security/
[16] "Tajikistan's Winter Struggle," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/